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INTRODUCTION

The law has traditionally drawn a distinction between voluntary
and involuntary intoxication. However, what the courts mean when
they use the expression "involuntary intoxication" is not as intelligible as one might assume. Involuntary intoxication is an exception to
the law of voluntary intoxication which is itself, or can be viewed as,
an exception to the usual rule that mental aberrations that are the
fault of the actor may not completely exculpate. In other words, mistake (the absence of mens rea) is not a defense if caused by intoxication unless the intoxication is involuntary. That means involuntary
intoxication should be purely a mens rea defense although the Model
Penal Code makes it an affirmative defense. 1 The prevailing rule
holds that involuntary intoxication can be an absolute defense to any
type of charge so long as the degree of intoxication is sufficient to satisfy the test of legal insanity in a given jurisdiction. This is true even
though it is clearly only a temporary mental incapacity. 2 The primary
This work was initially undertaken for L. TIFFANY & M. TIFFANY, TiE LEGAL
DEFENSE OF PATHOLOGICAL INTOXICATION WITH RELATED ISSUEs OF TEMPORARY
AND SELF-INFUCTED INSANITY (Quorum Books, a division of Greenwood Press,
Inc., Westport, CT, 1990). Copyright by Lawrence P. Tiffany and Mary Tiffany.
** Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law.
1. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(4)(Proposed Official Draft 1962).
2. This is true at common law and in most states today, but some tampering with
those rules can produce a somewhat different conclusion. For example, Missouri
has amended its involuntary intoxication statute so that it provides no defense on
the basis of impairment of control. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 562.076(1)(Vernon Cum.
Supp. 1989). The previous insanity statute did provide for such a defense. Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 562.086(1)(Vernon 1979). Thus, under this statute there is no longer
a correspondence between the meaning of "insanity" (mental incapacity) based
*
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question posed here is whether involuntary intoxication is an appropriate defense to encompass pathological intoxication as proposed by
the American Law Institute in the Model Penal Code.
Here is the general legal defensive structure. Pathological intoxication should fall under the defense of insanity if the preexisting, underlying cause precipitated by alcohol consumption is deemed a
mental disease or defect. It should fall under the automatism defense
if the pathological reaction to alcohol is based on something other than
a mental disease such as a blow to the head or a hypoglycemic condition due to an overdose of insulin. Whether there is any nexus at all
between involuntary and pathological intoxication is a point of further
definition but there is no intrinsic necessity to associate coerced drinking or alcohol sensitivity or surprise intoxication with pathological intoxication. Evidently based on a limited understanding of the
phenomenon of pathological intoxication, that is what the Model Penal Code may have done.
II.

THE MODEL PENAL CODE

The Model Penal Code's treatment of the various issues can be discussed with less difficulty if the entire section is reproduced.
Section 2.08. Intoxication.
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (4) of this Section, intoxication of the
actor is not a defense unless it negatives an element of the offense.
(2) When recklessness establishes an element of the offense, if the actor,
due to self-induced intoxication, is unaware of a risk of which he would have
been aware had he been sober, such unawareness is immaterial.
(3) Intoxication does not, in itself, constitute mental disease within the
meaning of Section 4.01 [the insanity rules].
(4) Intoxication that (a) is not self-induced or (b) is pathological is an affirmative defense if by reason of such intoxication the actor at the time of his
conduct lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate its criminality [wrongfulness] or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.
(5) Definitions. In this Section unless a different meaning plainly is
required:
(a) "intoxication" means a disturbance of mental or physical capacities
resulting from the introduction of substances into the body;
(b) "self-induced intoxication" means intoxication caused by substances that the actor knowingly introduces into his body, the tendency of
which to cause intoxication he knows or ought to know, unless he introduces
them pursuant to medical advice or under such circumstances as would afford
a defense to a charge of crime;
(c) "pathological intoxication" means intoxication grossly excessive in
degree, given the 3amount of the intoxicant, to which the actor does not know
he is susceptible.

Section (1) states the usual no-defense rule to the effect that ordion involuntary intoxication and the insanity defense based on mental disease.
However, this is an exceptional situation.
3. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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nary intoxication is not an affirmative defense, limiting its defensive
utility to a negation of the mens rea involved in the definition of the
crime. It is like the "defense" of mistake in that intoxication is no
more relevant than the charge makes it.
Section (2) adopts what is referred to as the "special rule" of intoxication: not only is intoxication narrowed to an elemental defense, it
will not even be permitted to negate mens rea except above the level
of "general intent" crimes, which is to say that intoxication can be a
defense only to specific intent crimes. The commentaries make it
clear that the Model Penal Code meant to include within the compass
of specific intent crimes those which require a culpability level of
either intent or knowledge.4 Some states changed this rule to assimilate knowledge-based crimes to "general intent" rather than "specific
intent" to further limit the utility of voluntary intoxication as a defense. Thus, while the construct of the Model Penal Code eliminates
reliance on the specific intent/general intent distinction, functionally
it merely assimilates knowledge as an element of the offense charged
to intent and permits evidence of intoxication to be adduced when
either of them is involved in the charge. 5 Others assimilate knowl6
edge to recklessness.
The Code, following American common law, adopted the rule that
intoxication "ought to be accorded a significance that is entirely coextensive with its relevance to disprove purpose [intent] or knowledge, when they are the requisite mental elements of a specific
crime." 7 The drafters noted that the prevailing attitude was toward a
special rule of intoxication, a rule which confines its defensive effects
to offenses which require a culpability degree greater than
recklessness.
Beyond this, there is the fundamental point that awareness of the potential
consequences of excessive drinking on the capacity of human beings to gauge
the risks incident to their conduct is by now so dispersed in our culture that
we believe it fair to postulate a general equivalence between the risks created
by the conduct of the drunken actor and the risks created by his conduct in
becoming drunk. Becoming so drunk as to destroy temporarily the actor's
powers of perception and of judgment is conduct which plainly has no affirmative social value to counterbalance the potential danger. The actor's moral
8

culpability lies in engaging in such conduct.

Based on this rationale, the Code adopted the generally prevailing
rule that voluntary or self-induced intoxication was sufficient reck4. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 comment 2 at 5 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
5. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 comment 2 at 4-5, comment 3 at 7-8 (Tent. Draft No. 9,
1959).
6. See, ag., COLO.REV. STAT. § 18-1-804 (1978).
7. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 comment 3 at 7 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).

8. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 comment 3 at 9 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
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lessness in itself to warrant denial of its use as a defense in any crime
which requires no higher level of culpability.
Section (3) is important to understanding the Code's treatment of
pathological intoxication because it makes clear that the Code adopts
the usual rule that ordinary intoxication is not per se a mental disease.
Section (4) recognizes two exceptions to the special rule of intoxication that equates drunkenness 9 with recklessness by providing that
two classes of intoxication cases are affirmative defenses, and hence
are available to the defendant even against charges based only on
recklessness or even lesser requirements of culpability. These two are
cases of intoxication which are not self-induced and pathological intoxication. By this first term the drafters tried to improve upon the
common law practice of referring to intoxication as "voluntary" or
"inVoluntary" with the implication that duress or coercion was all that
could be involved.0 "Self-induced" (voluntary) intoxication is defined
in section (5)(b) to require knowledge that the actor is ingesting something, but only negligence ("ought to know") as to the resulting intoxication. Whether the term "self-induced" in lieu of "voluntary"
adequately draws attention to the fact that what is involved is the degree of culpability in getting drunk, rather than the actor's ability to
avoid that result, is open to question, but that was the drafters' intent
and the provision has had substantial effect in state re-codification
efforts."1
III.

PATHOLOGICAL INTOXICATION UNDER
THE MODEL PENAL CODE

Pathological intoxication, which is dealt with in section 2.08(5)(c),
is of principal interest here, although it has been adopted by only a
few states.' 2 However, it is first necessary to consider the Code's
treatment of involuntary intoxication. It is the relationship of the two
that is crucial to understanding the Code's treatment of pathological
intoxication. The Model Penal Code distinguishes between pathologi9. We follow the convention of equating drunkenness with alcohol intoxication
although we are aware that there are both subjective and physiological determinants of behavior under each of these conditions. See, e.g., Rix, 'Alcohol Intoxication' or 'Drunkenness. Is There a Difference?, 29 MED., SCI. & L. 100 (1989).
There is, of course, a large component of subjectivity in experiencing intoxication.
10. 1 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.08 comment 3 at 363 nA0 (1985).
11. Thirteen states' revised codes and seven proposals parallel these proposed provisions relating to "self-induced" intoxication. Id. at 363.
12. 1 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.08 comment 4 at 366 n.49 (1985)
mentions RAW. REV. STAT. § 702-230(5)(c)(Supp. 1989)(based on MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.08 (Tent. Draft No. 9,1959) which had limited pathological intoxication
to those cases "caused by an abnormal bodily condition." The Hawaii version
reads "which results from a physical abnormality of the defendant."). See also
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-8(e)(3)(West 1982).
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cal intoxication and involuntary intoxication (referred to as intoxication which is "not self-induced"),'3 although both are given the same
defensive status. As with involuntary intoxication, pathological intoxication is made an affirmative defense if the resulting intoxication suffices to meet the insanity test of lack of substantial mental capacity on
either its cognitive or volitional branches. Neither defense requires
the mental disease or defect element which is needed in ordinary insanity cases. Having distinguished involuntary intoxication from
pathological intoxication, involuntary intoxication is then recognized
as consisting of three categories: nonnegligent mistake' 4 as to the tendency of the ingested substance' 5 to intoxicate, consumption pursuant
to medical advice,' 6 and consumption under duress or similar defensive circumstances.' 7
These categories do not apply to pathological intoxication which is
defined by the Code as "intoxication grossly excessive in degree, given
the amount of the intoxicant, to which the actor does not know he is
susceptible."' 8 Since Krafft-Ebing first identified it as a pathological
reaction to alcohol,19 pathological intoxication has been distinguished
from ordinary intoxication on the grounds that it is a qualitatively
unique psychological phenomenon. The defendant may have a high or
low blood alcohol level and therefore may or may not be intoxicated
13. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(4)(Proposed Official Draft 1962).
14. "Knows or ought to know" is used in MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(5)(b)(Proposed
Official Draft 1962).
15. Alcohol is never mentioned in the intoxication statute.
16. The Model Penal Code provision is not clear whether the doctor's advice cases are
examples of nonnegligent consumption of intoxicating substances or an independent basis of exculpation. Robinson, Causing the Conditions of One's Own
Defense" A Study in the Limits of Theory in CriminalLaw Doctrine, 71 VA. L.
REv. 1 (1985). DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 (1987) does not contain a provision on pathological intoxication, but DEL. CRIM. CODE COMMENTARY on § 423 at 90 (Proposed
1973), in reference to the section which was adopted on involuntary intoxication,
lists as one type of "involuntary intoxication," "an abnormal reaction to a drug
prescribed by a physician." The Delaware commentary lends support to the view
that the "doctor's advice" cases are based on lack of negligence, not necessity. On
the other hand, if the reaction to a drug is abnormal, is it relevant that it was
taken on a doctor's advice?
The meaning of fault on the part of the actor in cases of self-induced mental
incapacity has confused some courts. See, e.g., Tiffany, The Drunk, The Insane,
and The CriminalCourts: Deciding What To Make of Sef-Induced Insanity,69
WAsu. U.L.Q. 219 (1991).

For recent examples of violence blamed on a prescribed drug, see MurderTrials Introduce ProzacDefense, Wall St. J., Feb. 7, 1991, at B1.
17. Defenses such as duress or necessity are apparently the referents of the phrase
"circumstances as would afford a defense to a charge of crime" used in MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.08(5)(b)(Proposed Official Draft 1962).
18. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(5)(c)(Proposed Official Draft 1962).
19. Krafft-Ebing, 27 DTscH. Z. STARZNEK. 444 (1869). See also R. KRAFFr-EBING,
LEHRBucH DER PsyciuATmE ch. 4 (1897) cited in Banay, infra note 39, at 582,605.
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by physiological definition, but he clearly is not "intoxicated" in any
behavioral sense. His behavior is atypical for an intoxicated person.
As thus conceived, pathological intoxication involves alcohol, but it
does not involve ordinary,intoxication. However, the Model Penal
Code regards it merely as a form of intoxication, qualitatively indistinguishable, or distinguishable only in degree, from ordinary involuntary intoxication.
The involuntary intoxication defense presupposes actual intoxication ("a disturbance of mental or physical capacities resulting from the
introduction of substances into the body")20 as a condition of the defense. The only difference between the Model Penal Code's treatment
of pathological intoxication and involuntary intoxication is that pathological intoxication covers the situation in which the actor may kpow
that alcohol or other drugs are being consumed, but is not aware of the
degree of its intoxicating effects. Involuntary intoxication covers
those cases in which the actor is not aware and has no reason to be
aware that he or she is consuming something intoxicating at all. The
Model Penal Code's version of pathological intoxication allows for interactive effects of known intoxicants. Therefore, cases of drug interaction ought to be classed as pathological intoxication under the Model
Penal Code.
As a matter of drafting technique, it would appear that the Model
Penal Code could have included pathological intoxication as a fourth
type of involuntary intoxication. This could be accomplished by extending the first type of involuntary intoxication to consist of nonnegligent mistake or lack of awareness as to the tendency of the ingested
substance to intoxicate or to intoxicate to the extent it did. The federal
drafters came to the same conclusion and it is reflected in their draft:
Intoxication which (a) is not self-induced, or (b) if self-induced, is grossly
excessive in degree, given the amount of the intoxicant, to which the actor
does not know he is susceptible, is a defense if by reason of such intoxication
the actor at the time of his conduct lacks substantial capacity either to appreci21
ate its criminality or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.

In reference to the Tentative Draft's inclusion of pathological intoxication, the authors state:
The draft also treats "pathological" intoxication as not being self induced.
This phrase is sometimes used medically to refer to an outburst of irrational,
combative, destructive behavior after consumption of small quantities of alcohol. Sometimes it is termed an "acute alcoholic paranoid state." There is dispute among medical authorities as to whether such a syndrome exists.
Critical data supporting or disproving pathological intoxication apparently are
unavailable. It is a rare occurrence, at the most, and, in spite of reservations of
the writer in creating lacunae in the law, it was thought desirable to include
20. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(5)(a)(Proposed Official Draft 1962).

21.

NATIONAL COIMM'N ON

§ 502(4)(1970).

REFORM

OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, STUDY DRAFr
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its formulation.

22

The term "paradoxical rage reaction" is used by some writers to
describe the behavior associated with what is basically a toxic reaction
to psychotropic medication or nonprescribed psychoactive illegal
drugs. The name evidently derives from the fact that the medication
typically is given for its sedative effects or to reduce anxiety but in2
stead it may cause aggressive, violent behavior as a "side effect." 3
"The term 'paradoxical rage reaction' has been used in association
with reactions to certain pharmacologic agents of the benzodiazepine
class, notably chlordiazepoxide and diazepam." 24 An example is
Valium. Some researchers view pathological intoxication as a subclass
of paradoxical rage reaction in which the sedative drug is alcohol. 25
Noting that the literature discussed rage and violence in connection with the combined use of benzodiazepines other than alprazolam
and alcohol, one physician detailed the report of a patient who developed severe behavioral dyscontrol for the first time after exposure to a
combination of alprazolam and alcohol:
Ms. A experienced an episode of severe behavioral dyscontrol and amnesia
An hour after drinking approximately 3 oz. of 80-proof whiskey (her usual
daily consumption over the past several years), she broke into a neighbor's
house and "smashed everything in sight," destroying approximately $50,000
worth of property and inadvertently sustaining lacerations of both wrists from
broken glass. Afterward, she returned to her house, fell asleep, and upon
awakening had an incomplete recollection of the event, recalling only vague
22. NATIONAL COMM'N ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, Consultant'sReport
on IntoxicationDefense § 502, 1 WORKING PAPERS OF THE NATIONAL COMM'N ON
REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAws 223,227 (1970)(citing T. HARRISON, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDIcINE 1390 (5th ed. 1966) and F. REDLICH & D. FREEDMAN,
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY 755 (1966))(The Tentative Draft included a separate definition of the term "pathological intoxication." The Study
Draft does not use the term, but incorporates the definition thereof in subsection

4(b)).
The FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMM'N ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMI.
NAL LAws § 502(3) (1971) provides that intoxication resulting in satisfaction of the
insanity test is a defense when "if self-induced, is grossly excessive in degree,
given the amount of the intoxicant, to which the actor does not knowihe is susceptible. .. ."

Some of the drafters who did not propose adoption of the Model Penal Code's
pathological intoxication section have made comments on their decision. In the
commentary to ALA. CODE § 13A-3-2 (1982) it is stated that "[w]hile some proposed codes have recognized 'pathological intoxication' as a possible defense, it
has been omitted here, as the medical authorities do not agree whether such a
syndrome exists." Much of the disagreement is actually based on nosologic concerns which are of no significance to the legal questions. See Tiffany & Tiffany,
Nosologic Objections to the CriminalDefense of PathlogicalIntoxication: What
Do the Doubters Doubt?, 13 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 49 (1990).
23. See, e.g., PSYCHOTROPIC DRUG SIDE EFFECTS (R. Shader & A. DiMascio eds. 1970).
24. Lion, Azcarate & Koepke, "ParadoxicalRage Reactions" During Psychotropic
Medication, 36 DISEASES NERvous Sys. 557 (1975).
25. Id. at 558.
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images and sounds of breaking glass. She then surrendered herself to the police and was admitted to a psychiatric unit.... Ms. A had not evinced clinically significant behavioral dyscontrol after exposure to either alcohol or
alprazolam alone and
developed her destructive rage only while taking a com26
bination of the two.

Is this a case of pathological intoxication or involuntary intoxication? A case such as this goes beyond mere intoxication even though
the matter could sensibly be dealt with as involuntary intoxication
under existing classification schemes as well as the one proposed by
the Model Penal Code. However, the case seems more appropriately
labelled temporary insanity or automatism occasioned through no
fault of the actor.
The Model Penal Code is the only source of any significance that
categorizes pathological intoxication largely as simple intoxication aggravated beyond what the actor expected. Medical concepts of pathological intoxication have postulated that there is some underlying
cause for the behavioral reaction to alcohol; that drinking triggered an
effect of some underlying condition. Some authorities divide underlying causes into either those which are considered "mental disease" befitting a defense of legal insanity or those like brain damage which are
27
more accurately assimilated to automatism.
In what may be the quintessential case assumed by the Model Penal Code, a drug might potentiate the effects of alcohol and make the
actor surprisingly intoxicated given the known amount consumed.
The precision of the trichotomy dissipates, but only to a slight extent,
when it is realized that a drug can cause a temporary aberrational condition of the mind, and then cause a reaction to alcohol or other drug.
Such a case can be seen as either involuntary intoxication or pathological intoxication, as was the case involving Ms. A above.
What mainly divides the Model Penal Code's pathological intoxication from others, then, is that it includes merely transient irregular
conditions of the brain which can cause an abnormal reaction to alcohol or other drugs. Classical pathological intoxication posited a more
permanent underlying cause of the reaction. For this reason the
Model Penal Code version can be viewed as merely involuntary
intoxication.
The Code's treatment of pathological intoxication includes cases in
which there is absolutely nothing wrong with the actor and encompasses the pure drug/drug cases as well as the LSD-in-the-punch-bowl
cases. It is a transient reaction to a transient condition. This is significant because in these cases there will be no serious questions regard26. Terrell, Behavioral Dyscontrol Associated With Combined Use of Alprazolam
and Ethanol, 145 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1313 (1988)(letter to the editor).
27. L. TIFFANY & M. TIFFANY, THE LEGAL DEFENSE OF PATHOLOGICAL INTOXICATION
WITH RELATED ISSUES OF TEMPORARY AND SELF-INFLICTED INSANITY (1990)[hereinafter L. TIFFANY & M. TIFFANY, PATHOLOGICAL INTOXICATION).
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ing disposition because there is no argument that there is anything
medically wrong with the defendant. Conviction will be based on the
level of fault involved, if any, in becoming intoxicated. In cases of
classical pathological intoxication the added dimension of the underlying cause is present. Thus, the need for an additional appraisal regarding disposition arises because the underlying condition still
remains. Yet, so does the opportunity to mix drugs. Should Ms. A be
in a hospital?

The Model Penal Code's sense of pathological intoxication as only
quantitatively distinguishable from ordinary intoxication is fundamentally at variance with virtually all of the legal and medical literature on the subject. Because of this, conceivably the most felicitous
way to deal with the Code approach would be to classify it as a third,
distinct view of pathological intoxication, in terms of etiology, symptomatology, and legal consequences. It would be viewed as an augmentation of the established categories of mental disease-based
pathological intoxication which is best suited to the insanity defense,
and non-mental disease-based pathological intoxication which is
within the purview of the traditional involuntary act defense, automatism in particular.
The pathological intoxication defense drafted by the American
Law Institute is more akin to what is usually called alcohol sensitivity.
This describes a situation in which a person becomes more intoxicated,
not psychotic or unconscious, but drunker, than the amount of substance consumed normally would betoken. 28 For example, liver function impairment from a variety of causes can result in a person
becoming more intoxicated on less alcohol than a healthy person. In
addition, the degree of intoxication, measured by the behavioral impact of the alcohol, may vary within the same person with respect to
such factors as food in the stomach, fatigue, ambient temperature, and
emotional state. The important point is that these differences relate
to relatively narrow quantitative variations in the rapidity of onset or
the degree of resulting intoxication. But there is no question in such
cases that we are talking about drunkenness, all within relatively narrow limits of variance.
An example of greater consequence for the individual arises in
those cases in which alcohol and other drugs, or two prescription
drugs (or more) interact with each other in such a way that the effect
of one or the other is greatly intensified or their combined power is
more than additive. In these cases the reaction could be variable with
that person in the sense that his or her reaction to drinking six beers
will be vastly different from the reaction to the same amount after
28. Id. See also Bowman & Jellinek, Alcoholic Mental Disorder, 2 Q. J. STUD. ALcOHOL 312 (1941).
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taking certain controlled or uncontrolled drugs. 29 Even if the reaction
is extreme and even if the actor unquestionably should be exculpated
for resulting conduct, the situation still is one of involuntary intoxication, rather than pathological intoxication in the classical sense. This
is so because the reaction is entirely attributable to external causes
and not to any underlying condition of the actor.
It has been repeatedly emphasized in the literature that pathological intoxication or pathological reaction to alcohol is a qualitatively
different phenomenon from ordinary intoxication, even exaggerated
intoxication.30 "This warning is especially important since some textbooks, in the endeavor to make concise statements, have defined
[pathological reaction to alcohol] ... as intoxication following the ingestion of small quantities of alcohol." 3 1 Alcohol sensitivity, meaning
an abnormally strong influence on a person of a given amount of alcohol, may be either permanent or temporary. Permanent alcohol sensitivity can be hereditary32 or acquired. For example, it can even result
from brain injury, as can pathological intoxication. Temporary intolerance, or potentiation, may result from very short term effects of
drug-alcohol combinations 33 or even just from hunger or physical exhaustion. It can be of more lengthy duration as, for example, when
moving to a higher altitude. The oxygen deprivation (hypoxia) experienced with high altitude, it is thought, may increase the degree of
intoxication in the same person for the same amount of alcohol.34 In
29. Multiple drug cases show up with some frequency in the case law. Most of them
involve illegal "street" drugs but some are prescription. For example, in State v.
Davis, 653 S.W.2d 167 (Mo. 1983) a murder conviction was attacked on evidence
sufficiency grounds under an insanity plea. The defendant shot and killed a police officer with a shotgun. He had been a chronic alcoholic for over twenty years,
had been taking prescription drugs, including Valium, Librium, Dilantin, and
"Antibuse" [sic], probably had been drinking, displayed evidence of prior head
injuries and had been under psychiatric care. "Experts testified that appellant
suffered from a vascular malformation or scar tissue in his brain." Id. at 170.
30. Bowman & Jellinek, supra note 28, at 323.
31. Id. at 322.
32. See, e.g., Agarwal & Goedde, Human Aldehyde DehydrogenaseIsozymes and Alcohol Sensitivity, 16 IsozYMEs CURRENT Topics BIOLOGICAL MED. REs. 21
(1987)("flushing response" among some oriental families - Japanese, Chinese &
Korean - may contribute to relatively low incidence of alcoholism); Mizoi, Tatsuno, Adachi, Kogame & Fukunaga, Alcohol Sensitivity Related to Polymorphism
of Alcohol-MetabolizingEnzymes in Japanese,18 PHARMACOLOGY BiocHansTY
BEHAV. 127 (Supp. I 1983); Yoshida, Differences in the Isozymes Involved in Alcohol Metabolism Between Caucasiansand Orientals,8 IsOzYMES CURRENT TopIcs
BIOLOGICAL MED. RES. 245 (1983).
33. One explanation may be the variability of the permeability of the blood-brain
barrier which may be affected by drugs. See, e.g., Bloom, Neurohumoral Trans.
mission and the CentralNervous System in GOODMAN & GILMAN'S, THE PHAPMACOLOGICAL BASIS OF THERAPEUTICS 236, 245 (A. Gilman, L. Goodman, T. Rail & F.
Murad eds. 7th ed. 1985).
34. But see Collins & Mertens, Age, Alcoho and Simulated Altitude: Effects on Per-
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still other cases its etiology is never diagnosed. 35 Additionally, it has
been said that "[i]n practical terms... a woman will be less likely than
a man to predict accurately the effect of a given amount of alcohol
consumed." 36 A major reason for this is the hypoglycemia associated
with premenstrual syndrome.37
In many of these alcohol sensitivity cases the usual symptoms of
intoxication such as motor incoordination and slurred speech are present. This distinguishes these cases from pathological intoxication, in
the sense we have used it, but we are in no position to say that some of
these cases have not resulted in temporary insanity rather than
merely exaggerated intoxication. That has been one of the principal
objections to the term "pathological intoxication." It does not result in
drunkenness at all; it results in a temporary psychosis or automatism.
This is one of the reasons that some believe the better term, used origformance and Breathalyzer Scores, 59 AVIATION SPACE ENV'T MED. 1026 (1988),
suggesting a need for redefinition of performance effects of altitude and alcohol.
35. J. ANDENAEs, THE GENERAL PART OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF NORWAY § 30 (T.
Ogle trans. 1965)(citing G. Rylander & E. Bendz, RATrsPsYKIAI
67 (1947)) relates a Swedish case which provides an example of an offense committed during
pathological intoxication which had no known origin but which presumably
would fall within the loose category of "alcohol intolerance:"
A twenty-five-year-old man had been with his wife and small son at a
Christmas dinner with relatives and had taken a few drinks. He became
brutal and unpleasant to his wife on the way home. Weeping, she begged
him to desist until after they had come home and put the boy to bed.
When they arrived at home, the man grabbed his wife by the throat with
one hand and seized a big butcher knife with the other. The wife tore
herself free and ran out of the house, screaming for help. Before the
neighbors could come to her aid, the man had killed his son with the
knife, and had jumped out of the window, inflicting serious injuries on
himself.
It was later learned that when the man was about eighteen, he drank
a few glasses of wine at a family party and suddenly became rebellious
and acted indecently. After that, he abstained from alcohol until the fatal day when he made this one exception. He had then been married for
a few years. The marriage was a happy one, the husband enjoyed his
home life, and the little boy was the apple of his eye. Afterwards, he
became deeply depressed over his conduct, which he could not explain,
and he contemplated suicide. On the way home that fatal night an enormous rage had overcome him. "It was as if everything became red in
front of my eyes." He could not remember what had happened from
that moment on until he jumped out of the window. He hazily recalled
the sound of the broken glass and the stinging pains from the glass
splinters.
36. Blume, Women and Alcohol, 256 J. A.M.A. 1467, 1468 (1986).
37. We mean to be cautious on the subject of PMS as well as the other conditions so
as not to be understood as suggesting that alcohol sensitivity is the limit of the
role played by alcohol in these cases, especially in cases of PMS; we do not know
whether it plays more of a role than has as yet come to our attention. Our assertion in the text is that alcohol may cause a magnified level of ordinary intoxication in these instances. Whether it is capable of causing a psychotic reaction in
some of these instances is not known to us.
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inally by Krafft-Ebing, is pathological reaction to alcohol. 38 Banay's
article, relied upon in the commentary to this Model Penal Code section, is entitled "Pathologic Reaction to Alcohol."3 9 It is doubtful that
the latter term could be used exclusively to designate cases of insanity
and automatism while reserving the term pathological intoxication for
the event described by the Model Penal Code, exaggerated and surprise intoxication. Besides, the term pathological intoxication is
needed to cover "pathological reaction to alcohol" when the triggering
agent is not alcohol. It would serve as well to acknowledge that the
term pathological intoxication is used in three, somewhat overlapping,
ways: (1) a psychotic-type reaction to an ingested substance based on
an underlying mental disease; (2) a psychotic reaction to an ingested
substance due to an abnormal bodily condition not considered a
mental disease or defect; and (3) an unanticipated, high level of intoxication due to some interaction between the substance and some transient condition of the actor, or another substance taken by the actor.
It is evident that the Code is referring to alcohol sensitivity, which
results in common intoxication whether or not the actor is ignorant of
the susceptibility. The referent case is one of alcohol potentiation,
such as when alcohol is mixed with certain other drugs and the person
very quickly becomes extraordinarily drunk on ordinary amounts of
alcohol, or when preexisting bodily conditions such as fatigue or hypoglycemia cause the same effect. Given this limited notion of pathological intoxication found in the Code, it could have simply been included
within the scope of involuntary intoxication. Historically, these cases
have usually been treated as instances of involuntary intoxication because most of the courts have understood that the term "involuntary"
in this context includes lack of awareness of the fact or degree of intoxicating effects as well as instances of duress.
What, then, distinguishes the Code's definitions of involuntary intoxication and pathological intoxication? One reading of the drafters'
proposal is, if the actor did not know someone put LSD in the punch it
is a case of involuntary intoxication because he did not know the
punch was intoxicating at all. Alternatively, if the actor did not know
that his prescription drug would cause an adverse reaction if combined
with another drug like alcohol, it is a case of pathological intoxication
because although he knew the drugs were intoxicating he did not how
intoxicating. If that is all the draft means, then its rejection by most
of the states leaving the issue of unexpected intoxication to the involuntary intoxication defense and pathological intoxication cases to the
40
law of insanity or automatism seems well considered.
38. Krafft-Ebing, supra note 19.
39. Banay, PathologicReaction to Alcohol, 4 Q. J. STUD. ALCOHOL 580 (1944) cited in
1 MODEL PENAL CODE COMmENTARIEs § 2.08 at 364 n.45 (1985).
40. There is also some indication that some other countries also classify this type of
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Importantly, however, that is not what pathological intoxication
meant prior to this draft.41 Without the Model Penal Code, the case of
drug/drug combination would be treated as involuntary intoxication
and if the effects were unanticipated and so severe the actor was unconscious as a result, the matter would be dealt with as one of automatism. If instead, the reaction was caused by an underlying mental
condition, such as psychomotor epilepsy, some courts would treat it as
insanity and others as automatism. The difference would often
be explained in terms of whether psychomotor epilepsy was thought to be a
mental disease, although the actual ground of decision would probably
be the disposition of the actor. In effect, with the inclusion of the
Model Penal Code's interpretation, we now have three kinds of pathological intoxication, both factually and legally. However, it is not at all
clear what the Model Penal Code provisions add to the present situation. At best, the Code provisions on pathological intoxication and the
defense of involuntary intoxication are probably redundant. Several
states see it this way.42 At worst, the Code treatment undermines recpathological intoxication as involuntary intoxication. The Scandinavian countries
of Denmark, Norway and Sweden "recognize that so-called pathologic intoxication is an involuntary intoxication. Cases where a relatively small amount of alcohol or drugs have a completely abnormal effect are examples of pathological
intoxication." Hearingson Reform of the FederalCriminalLaws, Before the Subcomm. on CriminalLaws & Procedures of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 92nd
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, subpt. C, at 2551 (1972).
41. L. TiFFANY & M. TIFFANY, PATHOLoGICAL INTOXICATION, supra note 27.
42. Some drafts contain language substantially comparable to the Model Penal Code
but do not label it pathological intoxication, classifying it instead as another instance of involuntary intoxication. For example, STATE OF MARYLAND, COMM'N
ON CRiLM. LAw, 1 PROPOSED CRIM. CODE § 15.25 (1972) provided that one species of
involuntary intoxication "means intoxication caused without the negligence or
fault of the defendant by... substances introduced in quantities which produce
intoxication grossly excessive in degree, considering the amount of the intoxicant,
to which the defendant does not know that he is unusually susceptible." It is
noted that MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 was "redrafted to avoid use of the new
concepts of 'self-induced intoxication' and 'pathological intoxication' in favor of
the traditional 'involuntary intoxication."' Id.
Similarly, LEGISLATIVE SERV. COMM'N, PROPOSED OMO CRIM. CODE § 2901.35
at 55 (1971) defined involuntary intoxication to include intoxication "which is
grossly excessive considering the nature and amount of the intoxicating substance involved, and which is caused either by an abnormal bodily condition, or
by an unexpected reaction with other substances in the body." The statutes do
not use the term "pathological intoxication" and so are often omitted when states
are listed as having recognized the concept by statute. Indeed, the commentaries
to the Ohio Code make reference to Leggett v. State, 21 Tex. App. 382,17 S.W. 159
(1886), as within the purview of this provision, a case in which "the defendant was
held to be involuntarily intoxicated when his condition was caused in part by a
blow on the head after his having taken an amount of liquor insufficient to make
him drink [sic] under normal circumstances." PROPOSED OHIO CRIM. CODE at 56.
While the present Arizona statutes use the term voluntary intoxication, they
do not attempt to define involuntary intoxication. ARIZONA REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-503 (Supp. 1988). However, the ARiz. CRIM. CODE COIm'N,A iz.REV. CRim.

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:763

ognition of pathological intoxication based on insanity and automatism
defenses. Perhaps no harm is done if this species of pathological intoxication is subsumed under the heading of involuntary intoxication
and if it continues to be recognized that the definition used by the
Model Penal Code is not exclusive of the other two forms of pathological intoxication which are insanity and automatism.
The Model Penal Code is directed only to the actor who suffers no
more than surprise drunkenness. While that surely should be a defense in the proper circumstances, it is not the quintessence of pathological intoxication. Further, that situation is already embraced by
traditional common law and Code formulations of the involuntary intoxication defense. In the cases contemplated by the Model Penal
Code, the dominant agent of the dangerous behavior is alcohol intoxication. That is not the case in pathological intoxication in which the
actor is not intoxicated at all in the sense of drunkenness. To the
Model Penal Code, intoxication which is not self-induced is merely accidental intoxication and pathological intoxication is getting drunker
than might have been expected under the known circumstances.
While this interpretation cannot be rejected as wholly incorrect, it is
largely inconsistent with the historical definition of pathological intoxication. It is also worth emphasizing again that the drafters' main
work on this part of the Model Penal Code was published in 1959.
The Model Penal Code misdescribed the clinical phenomenon of
pathological intoxication in a way that is likely to lead to serious misinterpretation if it is taken to be exclusive. The provision has gained
some acceptance in the new criminal codes although some recognize it
for what it is. The drafter of one version of the proposed California
Penal Code, for example, says the section seems "akin to accidental
intoxication." 43 But accidental intoxication would have been covered
CODE § 502 at 73 (1975), had included a section on involuntary intoxication which
was not adopted and its commentary noted that involuntary intoxication "applies
in four situations: first, intoxicants taken under duress; second, intoxication
caused by a genuine mistake as to the character of the substance taken; third,
intoxication unexpectedly occurring from prescribed medication; and, fourth, in-

toxication from a weakness unknown to the defendant and grossly excessive to
[sic] the amount of stimulant taken." Id. at 74. This fourth category reflects the
Model Penal Code's view of pathological intoxication. The Arizona language acknowledges Kentucky as the source of its language and substantially identical
language is found in KY. CRIM. COMM'N, KY. PENAL CODE § 235, commentary at
24-25 (Final Draft 1971). Kentucky's provision appears in turn to be based on
State v. Altimus, 306 Minn. 462, 238 N.W.2d 851 (1976), and Altimus seems to
have gotten the fourth provision from the Model Penal Code's provision on path-

ological intoxication.
43. CAL. PENAL CODE § 510 at 37 (Tent. Draft No. 1 1967): "The Model Penal Code's
further proviso that intoxication is not a mental disease is a self-evident proposition. Its concept of 'pathological intoxication' seems akin to accidental intoxication and is also unnecessary if evidence of intoxication is made generally
admissible with respect to any culpable mental state." This proposal would also
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by the previous section dealing with intoxication which is not knowingly or negligently self-induced, had that section included mistake as
to resulting intoxication as well as the circumstance of what was
consumed.
Confusion with the Model Penal Code version will continue for
three reasons. First, by including a separate section on pathological
intoxication there is still an indication that the drafters were trying to
enunciate an additional rule. Second, the statute itself nevertheless
appears to be largely redundant with the defense of involuntary intoxication. Third, the content of the commentaries which accompany the
draft go well beyond the statute and tie in to the more medically accurate comprehension of pathological intoxication.
The most important clinical criticism is that the Model Penal
Code's statutory characterization of pathological intoxication is
framed in quantitative rather than qualitative terms. The reference is
to the "degree" of "intoxication", which must be "gross", "given the
amount of the intoxicant ...." This strongly denotes two points both
of which are wrong or misleading. It strongly suggests a requirement
of a relatively small amount of intoxicant; and second, it is almost certainly going to be taken as a reference to drunkenness because of the
repetitive use of the term intoxication. The defense of pathological
intoxication is, after all, described in section 2.08 which is entitled "Intoxication." Thus, a strictly textual analysis will indicate to the reader
that there is little doubt that the Model Penal Code is talking about
drunkenness which happens to result because of alcohol sensitivity,
caused by drug potentiation of the alcohol or otherwise, not pathological reaction to alcohol in the sense of alcohol aggravating a preexisting
affliction of the actor.44
This equation has already been made by some courts 45 and by
render irrelevant any distinction drawn in terms of whether the actor was culpable in contributing to his own mental condition caused by the intoxication unless
additional provisions were adopted, as the drafter recognized, the Model Penal
Code "explicitly provides that whenever recklessness or negligence suffices to
establish the offense, an exculpation based upon intoxication is precluded by
law." Id. at 36. The problem of fault in the context of the defenses of involuntary
intoxication and insanity is explored in Tiffany, supra note 16.
44. In P. Low, J. JEFFRiES & R. BONNIE, CRVMINAL LAW: CAsEs AND MATERILS (2d

ed. 1986), the authors, some of whom were also involved in updating and rewriting the American Law Institute's commentaries to the Model Penal Code, appear
to believe that pathological intoxication as formulated by the Model Penal Code
addresses both brain pathology and alcohol sensitivity. They state: "[tihis response, which may appear to involve loss of contact with reality, is a direct effect
of the intoxication itself; the person will return to normal as the blood alcohol
level falls. The disorder is thought to be associated with predisposing brain pathology as a result of which the individual may lose 'tolerance' for alcohol." Id. at
731. They also make the observation that the condition "has arisen in litigation
only a handful of times." Id.
45. In United States v. Gertson, 15 M.J. 990 (1983), a conviction for assault was af-
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prominent writers. For example, Professor LaFave in the principal
criminal law treatise used by the courts relies upon this Model Penal
Code taxonomy and discusses pathological intoxication in the context
of the intoxication defense but not in the context of the defenses of
insanity or automatism. He says "the intoxication is involuntary only
if the defendant was unaware that he is susceptible to an atypical reaction to the substance taken." 46 One could hardly argue with his interpretation of the Model Penal Code; that is what the statute
unfortunately says. And while he includes in his treatise a section
which discusses the relationship between automatism (including epilepsy) and insanity,47 pathological intoxication is not discussed in connection with either insanity or automatism, at least not in those
8
terms.4a
Because of the Model Penal Code's handling of the subject, Professor Robinson understandably makes the assumption that pathological
intoxication refers to getting unusually drunk on small amounts of alcohol. "An actor who becomes grossly intoxicated upon drinking two
cans of beer after a three day fast and who does not know that he will
be susceptible to such gross intoxication under such circumstances
may be pathologically intoxicated."49 That image and that understanding will be the legacy of the Model Penal Code. That excerpt
does not describe a pre-Model Penal Code pathological reaction to
alcohol.50
Another reason for supposing the Model Penal Code meant only
alcohol sensitivity or potentiation is that there is no justification for
selecting one particular psychopathological mental condition known
to afflict humans and to single it out in the Model Penal Code without
mentioning all or even any of the rest (e.g., schizophrenia), particularly in the middle of a statute on intoxication as a defense.
The Model Penal Code is all the more surprising because a reading
of the comments to the original draft, published in 1959, suggests that
the drafters meant to describe pre-Model Penal Code pathological intoxication or something akin to it. The failure appears to be in the
language of the draft. What they describe in the statute is involuntary
firmed. The defendant claimed the defense of pathological intoxication as formulated by the Model Penal Code but there was no evidence to support it other than
the fact that he had been drinking. Despite the lack of evidence for the claim, the
court broadly denied that military law (Marine Corps) recognized pathological
intoxication, After citing the relevant portions of the Model Penal Code and
DSM-III, the court characterized the problem as "low tolerance for alcohol." Id.
at 991-92.
46. 1 W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAw § 4.10(f)(1978).

47. Id. at § 4.9(c).
48. Id. at §§ 4.1-4.6, 4.9.
49. Robinson, supra note 16, at 46 n.153.
50. L. TIFFANY & M. TIFFANY, PATHOLOGICAL INTOXICATION, supra note 27.
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intoxication; what they describe in the commentary to that statute is
pathological intoxication as it has been known in the medical literature. The commentary states that the pathological intoxication section is:
designed to provide a defense in a few, extremely rare, cases in which an intoxicating substance is knowingly taken into the body and, because of a bodily
abnormality, intoxication of an extreme and unusual degree results. Such
cases involve a short, atypical reaction
to alcohol. It may be violent and may
51
occur after small amounts of alcohol.

But there is no known link between surprise intoxication and violence. Why would the subject of violence even be brought up unless
the drafters were talking about a qualitatively different reaction to
alcohol? Perhaps they were in the comments, but not in the statute
they ultimately proposed. People who get very drunk and are caught
off guard do not turn violent just because of their surprise drunkenness. There has to be more than that involved.
The Model Penal Code commentary cites the Banay article,52
describing it as "a review of the literature and case reports on pathological intoxication." The language just quoted is undoubtedly based
on the article. It is important to remember that while this draft was
developed after Banay had written his summary of the then existing
clinical psychiatric literature, the subsequent EEG-based studies and
the clear link to pre-existing conditions such as temporal lobe lesions
and brain damage had not yet been reported. Those became evident in
the early 1960s. 53 However, even at the time of Banay's article, and in
that article, the phenomenon is referred to as a psychotic condition,
not drunkenness. Banay was unquestionably of the opinion that clinically, "pathologic reaction to alcohol is clearly differentiated from
acute alcoholic intoxication."M
Next, however, the comments quote another case report by Podolsky55 of a homicide committed while the actor was suffering from hypoglycemia.56 That is followed by still another reported instance
involving hypoglycemia.5 7 Selection of these illustrations indicates
51. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 comment 7 at 11 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
52. Banay, supra note 39, at 580.
53. See, e.g., Marinacci, The Electroencephalogramin ForensicAlcoholism, 20 BuLL.
L.A. NEuROLOGIc Soc'y 177,179 (1955); Thompson, The Electroencephalogramin
Acute PathologicalAlcoholic Intoxication, 28 BuLL. L.A. NEuROLOGIC Soc'Y 217
(1963).
54. Banay, supra note 39, at 580.
55. Podolsky, The Chemical Brew of CriminalBehavior,45 J. CRIM.L., CRIMINOLOGY
& POLICE Sci. 675, 676 (1955)(cited as Podalsky in MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08
comment 7 at 11-12 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959)).
56. The blood sugar level is reported there as "below 100 mgm." Id. It would have to
be a good deal lower than that to be hypoglycemic.
57. Reported in a "London Letter," 122 J. A.M.A. 190 (1943), cited in MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.08 comment at 12 n.29 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). In the latter instance it
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confusion over what the drafters are trying to describe because in
Podolsky's article the emphasis is on hypoglycemia per se, not on hypoglycemia aggravated by alcohol. Most of the cases he discussed do
not involve alcohol at all but are cited as instances of spontaneous attacks attributable to hypoglycemia. Hypoglycemia is a candidate for
traditional notions of pathological intoxication because it is an underlying condition which can be aggravated by alcohol. But how does the
Model Penal Code intend to handle those cases in which the attack is
spontaneous? If they are to be treated as cases of insanity when alcohol is not involved, then why would the same reaction when triggered
by alcohol not qualify as insanity as well (if the actor was unaware of
the potential, as indeed he must be for the pathological intoxication
defense)? And if insanity covers these situations, then why have a
separate statute on it, and why in the intoxication defense section? In
our view, the hypoglycemia cases belong under either insanity or automatism depending upon one's view of the mental disease issue, and
that remains true whether the attack was triggered by alcohol or was
spontaneous. Instead, the Model Penal Code apparently wants these
cases treated as drunkenness in which the actor was taken by surprise.
Banay did include one 1933 summary, compiled by Seelert, which
associated pathological intoxication and hypoglycemia, 58 but the
Banay article is essentially a description of many of the previously reported discussions of pathological intoxication. The one article summarized was the first one to report a link between pathological
intoxication and hypoglycemic conditions. Seelert certainly did not
think that he was describing surprise intoxication. The point here is
not to dispute that hypoglycemia belongs on the list of underlying conditions which, when combined with alcohol, can cause pathological intoxication, for clearly it does. What is disputed is whether the
resulting condition belongs in the category of involuntary intoxication
or something comparable to it.
In Regina v. Quick,59 which discusses the English position on automatism, the court confronted the question of whether hypoglycemia
in combination with alcohol could be raised under a defense of automatism or must be raised in connection with the insanity defense only.
was reported that alcohol lowered the blood sugar level of the actor. The problem is that alcohol will usually increase the blood sugar level until well after
drinking stops and then it may lower it dramatically; but the time delay would
make alcohol consumption and hypoglycemia antithetical. There evidently are
instances in which reactive hypoglycemia may occur under the facts given but

there are insufficient details given to determine if that is what was diagnosed.
See also Regina v. Quick, 1973 Q.B. 910.
58. Seelert, Zur Frageder Entwicklungsbedingungendes PathologischenRauschs, 86
MONATSSCHRIFr PSYCHIATRIE NEUROLOGIE 191 (1933), cited in Banay, supra note

39, at 589.
59. 1973 Q.B. 910.
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Whatever the view, Quick was most certainly not taken by the English
court as a case of involuntary intoxication. Quick was not drunk surprised, foreseen, should have foreseen, due to abnormal bodily condition, or otherwise. What was at issue was whether the defendant
should be required to plead the case as one of insanity or permitted to
go to the jury on the automatism defense alone. The issue in the case
was correctly characterized, in contrast to a third possibility of involuntary intoxication, introduced implicitly in the Model Penal Code
draft.
Because of some of the language, partly because of the citation to
Banay and use of the term pathological intoxication, the impression
remains that the Model Penal Code drafters meant to recognize a
more medically sanctioned concept of pathological intoxication and to
assimilate one unusual kind of "intoxication" to the exculpatory law
of insanity. I rhetorically asked earlier why they included this statute
at all. Here is their answer:
[A] provision is required because of a concern that bizarre behavior, caused in
part by an abnormal bodily condition (in some cases, in others the atypical

intoxication can be related to mental disturbance), would not seem to result
from "mental disease" and thus would not fall under Section 4.01 [the insanity
defense]. There is substantial dispute among physicians whether "pathological intoxication" is a distinct clinical entity. Yet the term seems the best to
employ for legal purposes in describing a grossly abnormal
reaction to alcohol,
60
without respect to the medical reason for the reaction.

If the insanity defense would be appropriate when the reaction was
due to a "mental disturbance," what would prevent the case from being tried under the insanity defense and if not that, then as automatism? The Model Penal Code also approvingly cites Martinez v.
People61 where the court denied an instruction on pathological intoxication because the defendant had failed to plead insanity. 62 But under
the Model Penal Code, that would not be the correct ruling. The
drafters have suggested by its placement and language that pathological intoxication is not aimed at mental disease but targets only unusual and unexpected intoxication. Thus, the defendant in Martinez
should, under the position of the Model Penal Code drafters, have gotten his instruction on pathological intoxication without a special plea.
Pathological intoxication was not a "distinct clinical entity" prior
to this draft, although it most certainly was a recognized "clinical entity." As a result of this draft it is possible that pathological intoxication is even less distinct now. Prior to the Model Penal Code
formulation it was not a distinct entity because the resulting unconsciousness or insanity could have a variety of causes. Some of the
causes were mental diseases, some were mental defects, some were
60. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 comment 7 at 12 (Tent. Draft. No. 9, 1959).
61. 124 Colo. 170, 235 P.2d 810 (1951).
62. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 comment 7 at 12 n.30 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
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arguably either, such as temporal lobe epilepsy, and some were brain
damage as from trauma or temporary malfunctioning of the brain due
to biochemical imbalances. Still other causes, despite manifest clinical
signs of pathological intoxication, would never be known.
As originally drafted, pathological intoxication meant "intoxication
grossly excessive in degree, given the amount of the intoxicant, which
is caused by an abnormal bodily condition not known to the actor." 63
Two changes were made in the final version. The first dropped the
restriction of "bodily condition" 64 and the second was to include language to the effect "that the actor must not know of his susceptibility
to the excessive reaction. With this change, there seems no reason to
require that the reaction be 'caused by an abnormal bodily condition,'
as provided by the former draft."65 With the bodily condition limitation, the defenses of pathological intoxication and automatism would
overlap if the condition was extreme enough to result in unconsciousness. But when the bodily condition element was removed, it is not
clear how pathological intoxication differs from automatism or insanity since the cause of the reaction can now be a mental condition as
well as a bodily condition.
In State v. Holzman,6 6 the conviction of the defendant for simple
assault was upheld by the Superior Court of New Jersey on a de novo
review of the lower court record. The defense was that the defendant
had mixed a small amount of alcohol and a prescribed sedative. The
court reasoned that simple assault could be predicated on a mens rea
of recklessness. The New Jersey criminal code provides that "[w)hen
recklessness establishes an element of the offense, if the actor, due to
self-induced intoxication, is unaware of a risk of which he would have
been aware had he been sober, such unawareness is immaterial."67
This is the "special rule of intoxication" which applies only to voluntary or self-induced intoxication. The question reduced to the meaning of self-induced which the New Jersey code defined as:
"Intoxication caused by substances which the actor knowingly introduces into his body, the tendency of which to cause intoxication he
knows or ought to know, unless he introduces them pursuant to medi63. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(5)(c)(Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
64. Some states retain the 1959 Model Penal Code draft language referring to "which
results from physical abnormality." Hawaii provides "which results from a physical abnormality of the defendant." HAw. REv. STAT. § 702-230(5)(c)(Supp. 1989).
The New Jersey provision on pathological intoxication, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:28(e)(3)(West Supp. 1989), is based on MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 (Proposed Official Draft 1962), but the 1971 commentaries, which contain the same provision,
are based on MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959) and still refer to
a limitation in terms of the intoxication having to be due to "bodily abnormality."
65. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 at 40 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
66. 424 A.2d 454 (N.J. Super. 1980).
67. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-8(b)(West Supp. 1989).
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cal advice or under such circumstances as would afford a defense to
the charge of crime." 68
The Holzman court concluded that the intoxication of the defendant was self-induced under this standard. Notice that when the statutes which are patterned on the Model Penal Code are taken together,
they permit a finding of recklessness under the first section quoted
based on a negligence standard set out in the second section with respect to the likely effect of alcohol consumption. In combined effect,
"self-induced" intoxication can be found on the basis of negligence as
to the effect of the substance consumed despite the fact that the first
statute quoted seems, on the contrary, to require recklessness as to the
intoxication. In addition, the court does not discuss the language of
the second section quoted regarding the meaning of the "unless"
clause relating to prescribed medicine.
This interpretation, then, left the question of pathological intoxication. The state code had also adopted the Model Penal Code language
defining pathological intoxication as "intoxication grossly excessive in
degree, given the amount of the intoxicant, to which the actor does not
know he is susceptible." 69 To the contention that the defendant fell
within the purview of this affirmative defense, the court said that
pathological intoxication applied only to instances "which happened
because of some underlying organic condition."70 The statute, of
course, says no such thing and while the first draft of the Model Penal
Code on pathological intoxication had included the requirement that
the reaction be "caused by an abnormal bodily condition"71 this was
dropped in the Proposed Official Draft,72 which New Jersey actually
adopted. Alluding to the nosologic dispute about whether pathological
intoxication is a distinct clinical entity, the commentaries to the Model
Penal Code draft took the position that "the term seems the best to
employ for legal purposes in describing a grossly abnormal reaction to
alcohol, without respect to the medical reason for the reaction." 73
Deletion of the "bodily condition" limitation 74 in the final version
was designed to reflect the view just quoted that the abnormal reaction could as well be due to abnormal mental conditions as to bodily
conditions. It is also interesting to note the insistence on a legal
framework free to disregard psychiatric nosologic considerations:
"without respect to the medical reason for the reaction." Neverthe68. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-8(e)(2)(West Supp. 1989)(emphasis added).
69. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-8(e)(3)(West Supp. 1989).
70. State v. Holzman, 424 A.2d 454, 456 (N.J. Super. 1980). The court also said that
the "word 'pathological' itself means diseased or due to a disease." Id. at 456.
Does this exclude drug-alcohol combinations?
71. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(5)(c)(Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
72. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(5)(c)(Proposed Official Draft 1962).
73. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 comment at 12 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
74. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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less, the revised commentaries on the Model Penal Code describe the
defense as though the qualification were still present.75 Further, the
later commentaries do not otherwise clarify the sense of the drafters'
conception of pathological intoxication; the original commentary is essentially repeated.
Recall that section (3) provides that intoxication is not a disease.
Since the insanity defense will require proof of a mental disease or
defect, cases of pathological intoxication are not eligible if they are
perceived to be only special cases of intoxication. That is exactly the
way the Model Penal Code sees the situation, or at least drafted on the
situation. The drafters have not just singled out a special case of insanity and described it as involuntary intoxication. Rather, they have
created the impression that they excluded pathological intoxication
from the insanity defense, and have forced it to be tried as involuntary
intoxication even when an underlying abnormal mental condition is
involved. This, of course, means that if the defendant wins under the
pathological intoxication section, he is free to walk from the courtroom whereas treatment would have been an alternative had this section not been included and the matter more clearly left to the law of
insanity. If, to use their primary example, a person suffers from a
spontaneous attack of hypoglycemia he may be committed for treatment (or at least education regarding medical means of prevention or
management) if he wins on the insanity defense, which he surely
could do in some courts. However, if the defendant, by drinking, triggered the reaction himself, albeit inadvertently, and therefore falls
within the ambit of the Model Penal Code's version of pathological
intoxication, he may not be subject to any further state action. If successful, his disposition will be an outright acquittal as it would also be
if he had defended on the grounds of automatism. The same will be
true if the actor suffered from underlying conditions which are more
clearly in the category of "mental disease."
The Model Penal Code seems to have made a special case of pathological intoxication in order to take it out of insanity and deliberately
to put it under intoxication where it could be called involuntary or
voluntary depending upon the actor's state of mind at the time of
drinking. Pathological intoxication would be recognized as part of the
law of insanity or automatism without this section, as the case law
overwhelmingly shows. Why the drafters selected one medical category of mental disease and turned it alone into a singular legal defense
is something of a mystery, but we can at least explore it a bit. There
are two ways to state the "mystery": (1) Why did the drafters not
leave their formulation of pathological intoxication to the law relating
75. 1 MODEL PENAL CODE AND CoMMENTARIEs § 2.08 at 864 (1985).
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to involuntary acts, i.e., put it under automatism? (2) Why did they
not leave pathological intoxication to the law of insanity?
Pathological intoxication might be handled as the defense of automatism or involuntary act under the Model Penal Code. Section
2.01 restates the normal rules that require each crime be based on conduct which includes a voluntary act. Reflexes, convulsions, movements while unconscious or asleep, hypnotically suggested
movements, and any other act not the product of effort or determination are listed and excluded from the ambit of the concept of voluntary act.76 "People whose involuntary movements threaten harm to
others may present a public health or safety problem, calling for therapy or even for custodial commitment; they do not present a problem
77
of correction."
The revised commentaries do suggest that there is no reason that
even ordinary intoxication cases could not be so extreme as to fall
under the defense of involuntary act. "So long as liability can be premised on culpable voluntary behavior prior to unconsciousness, there
appears no sound reason to preclude the possibility that intoxication
may be so extreme that one is unconscious and incapable of voluntary
action."78 One assumes this would be equally true of pathological intoxication and in those cases there is a real possibility that liability
could not "be premised on culpable voluntary behavior prior to unconsciousness." The following passage exhausts what the Model Penal
Code has to say about automatism:
Any definition must exclude a reflex or convulsion. The case of unconsciousness is equally clear when unconsciousness implies collapse or coma, as
perhaps it does in ordinary usage of the term. There are, however, states of
physical activity where self-awareness is grossly impaired or even absent, as in
epileptic fugue, amnesia, extreme confusion and equivalent conditions.7 9
How far these active states of automatism should be assimilated to coma for
this legal purpose presents a difficult issue.
There is judicial authority supporting the assimilation. An alternative approach, however, is to view these cases as appropriate for exculpation on the
ground of mental disease or defect excluding responsibility. This view has
also had support in the decisions. It offers the advantage that it may facilitate
commitment when the individual is dangerous to the community because the
condition is recurrent. By the same token, however, it bears harshly on the
76. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(1), (2)(Proposed Official Draft 1962).
77. 1 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.01 at 215 (1985)(citations omitted).
78. 1 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.08 at 353 (1985).
79. N. MORRIS & C. HOWARD, STUDIES IN CRIMINAL LAW (1964); H. WILY & K.
STALLWORTHY, MENTAL ABNORMALITY AND THE LAW

138-41, 151-85 (1962);

Clapham, An InterestingCase of Hypoglycaemia, 33 MEDICO-LEGAL J. 72 (1965);
Rapaport, Consciousness: A Psychopathologicatand Psychodynamic View, in
PROBLEMS OF CONSCIOusNESS: TRANSACTIONS OF THE SECOND CONFERENCE 18,
21-25 (H. Abramson ed. 1951); Wright, Variations in States of Awareness in

Schizophrenic Patients,in PROBLEMS OF CONSCIOUSNESS: TRANSACTIONS OF THE
SECOND CONFERENCE 100 (H. Abramson ed. 1951).
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individual whose condition is nonrecurrent, as in the case where an extraordinary reaction follows the administration of a therapeutic drug. And there
may be a difficulty in regarding some of these conditions as a "mental disease
or defect" within the meaning of Section 4.01 or other tests, although cognition is sufficiently impaired to satisfy that aspect of the test.
The provision does not define "unconsciousness" and thus does not attempt
a legislative resolution of the issue. It employs the term that has had standing
in the statutory law of many states, leaving the problem of interpretation, as it
has previously rested, with the courtsO

There are two possibilities as to why pathological intoxication was
not left to the law of insanity. The first, which also applies to automatism, is that it was felt pathological intoxication required special treatment because the drafters wanted to place a fault limitation on the use
of the pathological intoxication defense and restrict its use to nonfault situations. They did not want to place a similarly explicit fault
limiter on the insanity defense or on the involuntary act defense,
although it is not clear why either of these would be so. It would, of
course, be novel in both cases. In the case of involuntary act, the drafters have already created a fault limitation by approval of the decision
in Decina,S1 which found a culpable voluntary act in getting into an
automobile to drive while aware of a possible blackout.
The idea of placing a fault limitation on defenses is certainly not
novel, but the idea of doing so is not ordinarily associated with the
defense of insanity whereas fault has long been the distinguishing feature between voluntary and involuntary intoxication. The belief
might have been that because the reaction could be triggered by the
actor through his or her own conduct, a form of self-inflicted insanity,
there was a need for an explicit fault limitation to be built into such a
80. 1 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.01 at 219-220 (1985)(citations omitted).
Evidently only one legislative body has accepted the invitation to resolve the
last question. Hawaii required that when an involuntary act defense "is based on
a physical or mental disease, disorder, or defect which precludes or impairs a voluntary act or a voluntary omission, the defense shall be treated exclusively according to the provisions. . ." of the insanity defense. HAW. REV. STAT. § 702200(2)(1985). The commentary to § 702-201 explains that
[t]he Code attempts to provide "therapy or... custodial commitment"
for those dangerous individuals who are unable to conform their conduct
to the requirements of the law because of some condition which would
be difficult to regard as a "mental disease or defect" under orthodox
treatment of penal irresponsibility. At the same time, because treatment
is flexible and tailored to the condition in question, it does not bear
"harshly on the individual whose condition is nonrecurrent."
However, in 1986, this statute was amended to provide in addition that "a defense
based on intoxication which is pathological or not self-induced which precludes or
impairs a voluntary act or a voluntary omission shall be treated exclusively according to this chapter," i.e., the chapter which includes the provision relating to
involuntary acts. HAw. REV. STAT. § 702-200(2)(Supp. 1989).
81. People v. Decina, 2 N.Y.2d 133, 157 N.Y.S.2d 558, 138 N.E.2d 799 (1956), discussed
in L. TIFFANY & M. TIFFANY, PATHOLOGICAL INTOXICATION Ch. 9, supra note 27.
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defense. Thus, the decision was made to move the defense to the involuntary intoxication section where such a limitation would not be
unusual. No other psychiatric phenomenon is singled out for special
treatment, other than psychopathy which is denied any status. Pathological intoxication is the only temporary psychosis which is explicitly
recognized. The reason for doing so may only have been to place a
fault limitation on its invocation.
Under the Model Penal Code, involuntary intoxication, pathological intoxication, and involuntary act are actually all examples of
mental incapacity that are not disease-based. It is unfortunate that
the fault idea was executed in such a circumscribed fashion. The concept of fault as a limitation on defenses is more fundamental than the
Model Penal Code's treatment of it. The relevant category is nondisease-based nonculpability. It is difficult to believe that the drafters
thought an exculpatory mental condition could only be brought about
by either (1) mental disease or defect; or (2) ingested substances. All
such conditions, including simple mistake, could have been treated
comparably. In that unitary approach the drafters could also have included standards for determination of when fault on the part of the
actor would limit the availability of the defense.
One reason the Model Penal Code had to build a fault limitation
into the pathological intoxication defense is that the Code does not
provide for any requirement of "mental disease or defect" which
might otherwise have provided the necessary functional analogue to a
fault limitation. Conversely, the fact that the drafters had to put in an
explicit fault limitation expressed in terms of the actor's awareness of
the likely outcome of drinking while they have no explicit fault limitation at all in the insanity defense, indicates that they believe the concept of disease serves that purpose under insanity law. Here the
defense is written as applicable when the condition occurs "by reason
of intoxication" while under the insanity defense it must arise "by reason of disease or defect."
This structure also indicates that the drafters did not believe that
pathological intoxication was a mental disease or defect and that suggests a second possible explanation. The drafters assumed that pathological intoxication might otherwise not be recognized as
appropriately treated under insanity law because they believed that
mental disease or defect was not involved. In fact, that is the reservation they expressed in the quoted material above. Yet, their own citation of medical authority partially contradicts that conclusion. The
comments say that intoxication which is not self-induced may provide
an excuse "only if the resulting incapacitation is as extreme as that
which would establish irresponsibility had it resulted from mental disease." Thus, mental disease cases are clearly meant to be excluded
from the Model Penal Code's concept of pathological intoxication.
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Yet, historically, mental disease cases were at the core of the concept
of pathological intoxication. Unless the Model Penal Code drafters
mean to undo or ignore all that, they must expect those cases of pathological intoxication to be tried as insanity cases.
Another problem presented by the Model Penal Code's definition
of pathological intoxication is that the notice provision confuses responsibility questions with the medical definition of the condition.
However, that seems to be exactly what the drafters meant to do. Professor Paulsen was a special consultant to the Model Penal Code's provision on intoxication (section 2.08) and he subsequently described
pathological intoxication in these terms:
In situations of pathological intoxication, the violent and abnormal effects of
drinking are completely surprising to the drinker, without warning in experience or education. In these rare cases the consequences of even a single drink
may, in reality, be more
lurid than the fertile imagination of the most dedi82
cated prohibitionist.

The Model Penal Code would permit negation of the existence of
the condition by proof of the defendant's awareness of the condition.
That is nonsensical if the drafters are indeed attempting to describe a
medical reality, although it is not if they mean to describe only involuntary intoxication. The medical reality is that the actor is or is not
susceptible to pathological reaction to alcohol and the person's awareness is irrelevant to that fact. The actor's awareness is relevant only
to criminal liability and the two points ought to be kept separate for
they are quite distinct matters.
The fact that pathological intoxication is defined as non-existent if
the actor is aware that his condition8 3 might lead to such a reaction is
only a matter of aesthetics. The Model Penal Code can define pathological intoxication in terms of the actor's lack of awareness of the
condition precisely because the Model Penal Code is not defining a
medical condition; it is defining a legal condition of exculpation. Were
pathological intoxication given its medical interpretation, the draft
would be patently absurd for it would then say that the defendant did
not have psychomotor epilepsy if he knew he had it. What is meant
then is that the defense of pathological intoxication does not exist
82. Paulsen, Intoxication as a Defense to Crime, 1961 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 17.
83. When MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(5)(c)(Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959) contained the
provision limiting the defense to reactions caused by an abnormal bodily condition, the phrase was never defined. Does it include fatigue, drugs in the body or
latent psychosis? Does this include mental conditions as well? Does it include
brain damage that contributes to mental illness? These, of course, are the same
problems courts have in trying to distinguish automatism from insanity in pathological intoxication cases and otherwise. The English distinction between sane
and insane automatism may turn on the same distinction, although it would seem
those courts are beginning to take a more pragmatic view influenced heavily by
the differing dispositions involved. These matters have been addressed in L. TIFFANY & M. TIFFANY, PATHOLOGICAL INTOXICATION Ch. 7, supra note 27.
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when culpable awareness exists. But handling the fault issue in this
manner leaves the obvious problem that pathological intoxication is
not intoxication in the ordinary sense at all.
IV. CONCLUSION
The effect of the Model Penal Code draft, given the influence it has
had and will continue to have, is that we must now recognize still a
third category of pathological intoxication. The first two consisted of a
temporary psychotic condition brought on by a triggering effect of alcohol on an underlying mental disease or defect that legally assimilates to temporary insanity. The second type, which was also stressed
by the early clinicians, was closely related but the underlying cause
could not fairly be said to be attributable to a condition that would fall
within the legal idea of mental disease or defect under insanity laws,
though the effect of the alcohol on the actor was the same as if it were.
These are the automatism cases. The third type now introduced by
the Model Penal Code despite the best efforts of everyone else to distinguish it, is surprise intoxication, where the unforeseen aspect is the
resulting degree of intoxication, but it is intoxication nevertheless. It
is distinguishable from involuntary intoxication only in that the mistake by the actor is with respect to the resulting intoxication rather
than the existing circumstance of the nature of the intoxicant consumed. This is basically pathological intoxication as a species of involuntary intoxication, to be distinguished from the legal insanity type
and the automatism or involuntary act type.
Most jurisdictions have not adopted the Model Penal Code provision on pathological intoxication. More states have adopted the Model
Penal Code's provision regarding involuntary intoxication than have
adopted the section on pathological intoxication. Presumably in those
states, defense counsel must choose how the case is to be tried, or the
courts will have to give some indication as to when and why one defense category is more appropriate or required. Whether the defense
of pathological intoxication is more germane to the defense of insanity, involuntary act, or involuntary intoxication depends largely on
the type of pathological intoxication involved.84 There will still be the
possibility of overlapping defenses in a case of pathological intoxication in which the defendant acted in an unconscious state due to
mental disease or defect. In that case, the facts will fit both insanity
and automatism. While only a few states adopted the provision on
pathological intoxication, it is not at all uncommon for the Model Penal Code to have influence in the courts, including the federal
courts,8 5 well beyond the sway it may have in the legislative branch. It
84. L. TIFFANY & M. TiFFANY, PATHOLOGICAL INTOXICATION, supra note 27.

85. See, e.g., Kane v. United States, 399 F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1968).
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may be important, then, to understand just how poorly drafted the
pathological intoxication section actually is and that is the issue this
Article addresses.
As the law continues to struggle with pathological intoxication, an
aesthetically appealing trichotomy emerges in light of the Model Penal Code's proposal. Pathological intoxication would be conceived of
as (1) mental disease based, ideally dealt with under insanity law; (2)
physical disease or trauma based, presumably belonging to the defense
of involuntary act or automatism; and (3) exaggerated and surprise
intoxication, to be handled as the defense of involuntary intoxication.
This view is sufficiently problematical that it is difficult to endorse
it enthusiastically. The concept of mental disease is all that practically
separates insanity and automatism and that is perhaps too ephemeral
a foundation upon which to build. All that separates involuntary intoxication from insanity is the same concept and insanity is largely a
legal conclusion, not an objective, identifiable fact. Further, if the actor is rendered unconscious, there may be no difference between involuntary intoxication and automatism or involuntary act. If one
could count on a reliable factual distinction between the categories of
defenses, it would be important to make those distinctions. However,
the important matters actually are the nature of the disposition of the
defendant when the case is resolved, fault on the part of the actor, and
notions of what legally constitutes "mental disease or defect." The
distinction between mental disease and other causes is not a distinction that would be expected to endure. Still, such a trichotomy is
probably better than the level of understanding presently exhibited in
a variety of contexts; it provides a framework of explanation.

